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Introduction 
Ever since Descartes sat down by the warmth of his stove to critically examine his 
deepest beliefs, the concept of examining our inner self’s as thinking beings has been 
a subject of great interest to philosophers and psychologists around the globe. 
There was an explosion of interest in the work of Charles Darwin, and even more 
after the Second World War, when cognitive sciences became the great center point 
for psychology and the new science of neuroscience emerged. These developments 
have pushed the issue of consciousness into the forefront of scientific research. 
And what makes consciousness so interesting, unlike a great many other subjects of 
concern in philosophy and science, is that the conscious mind remains a chapter yet 
to be completed. The topic remains a contested field of research to this very day, and 
various points of view strive to give the most solid and well defined theory of 
consciousness. 
For many, if indeed not most of those who try to do scientific research in 
consciousness, a strong belief exists that consciousness arises from the material 
world, specifically the brain. For the scientists who hold this view, as with many 
other views of modern science, a reductionist theory is the natural, indeed the only 
reasonable path to take in examining the challenge of explaining the origin and 
functions of consciousness. 
But there have always been opposition to materialist views. Surly our awareness of 
our self’s is something so special, so intimate, that it cannot be reduced to the 
behavior of electrons and other fundamental particles. In short, many of us adopt a 
position of dualism which holds that matter and mind are two totally separate 
substances.  More recently there has been an upsurge of dualism in Philosophy of 
Mind. A number of philosophers (often called New Mysterians, or even Qualia 
Freaks), explore the idea that consciousness is not fully explainable within a 
4 
 
reductionist theory. Modern dualists claim that there are aspects of our inner life that 
lie beyond the reach of contemporary science.  At the heart of their position lie 
Qualia or Raw experiences. For a modern dualist it makes no sense to say that 
science can tell us something about subjective inner experience. They do not deny 
that cognitive science can tell us a lot about the way human beings actually function. 
But they keep coming back to the same point: why is behavior accompanied by inner 
experience? The material world and the experiential world are so different (they 
argue) that a reductionist theory cannot be used in solving the question of the origin 
and workings of the conscious mind. 
One of the best known contemporary dualists is David J. Chalmers, who with his 
article “Facing up to the challenge of Consciousness”(1995) and his book “ The 
Conscious Mind” (1996),  attempts to defend the dualist position and give a dualistic 
answer to what he dubs “The Hard problem”. Indeed Chalmers do sketch some 
preliminary ideas toward a fundamental theory for consciousness.  
Chalmers´ work has received a great deal of attention, needless to say his work have 
been heavily criticized by reductionists, this project is devoted to exploring the ideas 
of Chalmers and his critics.  
 
Problem Definition 
 How does Chalmers explain consciousness, and what in his theory is new to 
the dualist view? 
 Is the critique of Chalmers well agued for, and can Chalmers´ views be 
defended? 
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Method  
The method of this project is to analyze and discuss the chosen texts and the central 
theories of these texts. The Project intends to display a critical attitude on the central 
text and theories in question, that of David J. Chalmers theory of consciousness. 
The analysis will serve to build a framework for the discussion of Chalmers´ theory 
and the criticisms raised against his theory. 
For my critique of Chalmers I have selected the Daniel C. Dennett text “Facing 
Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, because I found it to be the most 
central and relevant critique of Chalmers´ theory, as it strikes at the heart of 
Chalmers´ distinction between what he calls the “easy” and “hard” problem and at 
Chalmers supposed solution to the “hard” problem.   
 
Theory of Science 
The project is limited due to the upper limits of text space allowed, and therefore I 
cannot manage to give anything close to a full view of the debate on consciousness, 
or for that matter of the many different critiques of Chalmers´ point of view. 
Therefore I have selected only the critique I have found the most relevant and 
important, and have intentionally not included any other possible views.  
I remain aware that even though the project have a critical view on Chalmers, I have 
an interest in defending Chalmers as well as criticizing his theory’s,  this is largely 
due to the fascinating idea of what effects it might have on our philosophy’s and  
Sciences of mind, if Chalmers were to be proven right. 
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 Conceptual Clarification 
 
Before diving into the discussion of Chalmers theories, we will first have to get 
familiar with a number of concepts relevant for this debate. 
 Consciousness  
Consciousness, a word we all know and use concerning ourselves and other living 
beings at first suggests wakefulness or the existence of a mental presence. But when 
we look closer, the concept of Consciousness contains many different aspects each of 
which seems important in their own right, and different from the others. For example 
consciousness can be seen as involved in all the following examples, and probably 
many more: 
• The ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli; 
• The integration of information by a cognitive system; 
• The reportability of mental states; 
• The ability of a system to access its own internal states; 
• The focus of attention; 
• The deliberate control of behavior; 
• The difference between wakefulness and sleep. 
(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, p. 10) 
 
And in fact, in the debate over Consciousness that we will concern ourselves with in 
this project, we are concerned with none of the above. 
Rather, the aspect of consciousness that we will be discussing, will be what might be 
called the raw feel, or the phenomenological quality or the subjective experience 
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within the conscious mind of human beings. To put in another way, we are very much 
concerned with the experience of Qualia. 
The challenge of consciousness viewed from this angle, is that while our inner life is 
very real to us, it is not immediately clear whether scientific explanations are capable 
of explaining why we have them. In a nutshell, there is a potential divide between 
subjective and objective here; should we stick with the subjective view of our 
experience, or is the more objective perspective of science capable of explaining our 
own subjective experiences to us. 
For some of the participants in the debate, the question is not relevant at all. Many of 
them do not view Qualia as a problem at all. One side insists that there is nothing 
more to say about subjective experience then can be revealed by examining the brain 
and its functions. For others this simply cannot be done: Consciousness cannot 
simply be reduced to the brain and its activity. Consciousness may function in 
connection with the brain, but it cannot simply be explained via the usual scientific 
method of reduction. 
We can categorize the two different parts of this debate as the views of dualism and 
the view of materialism. Within these two categories many versions exist. 
As these two theories lies at heart of our discussion, it is important for us to have a 
look at them in more detail before we go further with the debate. 
 
 Dualism  
The dualist approach to the mind exists in several different forms; what they all agree 
upon is that the essential nature of conscious intelligence resides in something 
nonphysical (Matter and Consciousness p.7), and (at least in traditional forms) that it 
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remains forever beyond the scope of sciences like physics, neurophysiology, and 
computer science. 
 Dualism is probably not the most widely held view in current philosophy, and  it is 
certainly not the most commonly held view in the scientific community, but it is the 
most commonly held view of the general public. This is probably because dualism is 
anchored in most of the world’s major religions, and thus has been the dominant 
theory of mind for most of history. 
Substance Dualism 
This is the view that the mind is a distinct nonphysical thing. This thing, our identity 
is independent of the physical body to which it may be only temporarily “attached”. 
Substance dualism, finds its origins in Cartesian dualism, created by René Decartes. 
Decartes created the first dualistic perspective of the mind and body as separate 
things; the great challenge to this view however, is the problem of how the mind 
influences the body. If the mind is not physical and is a totally separate thing, there is 
a clear problem; Decartes´ attempted answer of supposed “animal spirits” that convey 
the mind´s influence to the body (via the pineal gland), only recreates the problem at 
a new level; now we must ask “how do the animal spirits interact?” 
Such problems with Cartesian dualism have provided the motivation for considering 
a less radical dualism; this we find in what we might call popular dualism.  
Popular dualism is a version of substance dualism, as it views the mind as a spiritual 
substance that inhabits the body. Even though it remains unlike physical matter in its 
internal constitution, mind has spatial properties: it is the ghost in the machine. Thus 
popular dualism views the mind as actually in contact with the brain, perhaps their 
interaction can be understood in terms of their exchanging energy in some form that 
our science has not yet recognized or understood? This view could perhaps be 
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supported by the fact that matter is energy (familiar from the work of Albert 
Einstein). 
But although this explanation works well in providing plots for TV-shows and 
novels, popular dualism cannot be regarded as a serious theory. 
 
Property Dualism 
Thinking of the mind as a substance gives rise to problems. Property dualism 
attempts to avoid these problems, by insisting that the mind is not a substance beyond 
the physical brain; rather the brain itself has a set of properties possessed by no other 
kind of object. 
It is these special properties that are non- physical, hence the term property dualism. 
Good examples are properties such as having a pain or the sensation of red. These 
properties are characteristic of conscious intelligence, and clearly seem to be 
associated with very special physical places, namely brains. 
These nonphysical properties are held to be non-reducible to a physical origin, and 
require instead a new and independent science of “mental phenomena”, if we are to 
understand them properly. But property dualism exists in several versions. We need 
to take a closer look at these versions to understand the work of Chalmers. 
Epiphenomenalism 
Epiphenomenalism, meaning “Above the phenomenal“, takes the view that while 
mental phenomena exist (or exist alongside the physical) and remain quite real, and 
are caused by the various activities of the brain, the phenomena themselves have no 
causal effect on the physical: they are simply there. 
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This view, however, does not sit well with all property dualists, and the “demotion” 
of mental properties to simple causally impotent by-products of brain activities seems 
extreme. Moreover, epiphenomenalism invites an obvious response: if the mental 
doesn’t cause anything, why is it there? Therefore a view closer to the convictions of 
common sense has become more popular:  Interaction property dualism. 
Interaction Property Dualism 
This view differs from the previous in one essential aspect: mental properties do 
indeed have casual effects on the brain, and thereby also on behavior. 
According to this view, mental properties are “emergent”.  That is, these properties 
do not appear until ordinary physical matter has managed to organize itself through 
the evolutionary process, into a system of sufficient complexity. 
Here however rises a dilemma: since dualism holds that mental states and properties 
are irreducible (the central tenet of dualism) it seems paradoxical that mental 
properties seem to arise at a fairly well-defined level of physical complexity, and yet 
we are not able to give a physical explanation of them. After all the dualist must insist 
that the mental properties, once arisen are irreducible to physical nature. 
 
Elemental Property Dualism 
“A Property dualist is not absolutely bound to insist on both claims. He could let go of 
the thesis of evolutionary emergence, and claim that mental properties are 
fundamental properties of reality, properties that have been here from the universe´s 
inception, properties on a par with length, mass, electric charge and other 
fundamental properties.” (Matter and Consciousness p. 12) 
 Since properties like electromagnetism are fundamental properties we have accepted, 
after a change of paradigm, the same might happen with mental properties.  Perhaps 
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mental properties might come to enjoy a status like that of electromagnetic 
properties: irreducible, but not emergent. 
The one problem with this view is, that the example of electromagnetism differs from 
mental properties due to the fact that electromagnetism is present everywhere, but 
mental properties are only present where we find a brain. Unless of course we 
consider objects without a brain to be able to have mental properties. 
 
Qualia  
Qualia are a widely used term in philosophy of mind. Qualia are essentially the raw 
feel, the personal inner experience of consciousness, what we may also call the 
subjective quality of experience. 
An important discussion of Qualia as put forth by Frank Jackson in his article 
“Epiphenomeal Qualia”(1982) , concerns color. His discussion suggests that another 
person can never know whether my personal inner experience of the color red, is the 
same as another person´s experiences when experiencing something “red”. 
We may have an official agreement on what is colored “red”, and may even have 
studies of the color red, but we have no way of knowing or displaying the individual 
inner experience of “red”, as our words used to describe red are only describing what 
we commonly agree on concerning the color red. 
According to dualists like Frank Jackson (who refers to himself as a Qualia Freak), 
Qualia are epiphenomenal, and therefore cannot be understood via the classic 
methods of science.  Nonetheless, Qualia exist and are a crucial part of human 
experience.  
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 Materialism  
Materialism is the view that we are creatures of matter, subject to the ordinary laws 
of nature. 
There are many arguments against dualism and for materialism, and one of the 
strongest is that of neural dependence (Matter and consciousness p. 20). Our 
consciousness is clearly dependent on brain states: If the brain is affected, let’s say by 
brain damage or drunkenness, then so is consciousness. The materialist stand, 
especially given the power of modern science, seems to open more options for 
explaining consciousness than dualism does. 
As with dualism, however, there are several versions of materialism to look at. 
 
Philosophical Behaviorism 
This theory view focuses not on consciousness and how it works, but more on how 
we address the matter, and what we are actually addressing when speaking of mental 
states. 
Philosophical Behaviorism claims that when we speak of emotions, sensations, 
beliefs and desires, we do not in fact talk about some ghostly inner occurrences, 
instead we are talking of actual and potential patterns of behavior. 
The strongest version of this theory would claim that:  
“any sentence about a mental state can be paraphrased, without loss of meaning, into 
a long and complex sentence about what observable behavior would result if a person 
in question were in this, that, or the other observable circumstance” (Matter and 
Consciousness  p.23).  
The best known exponent of this form of materialism is Gilbert Ryle. 
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Reductive Materialism 
The version of the materialism sometimes also referred to as “the identity theory”, 
holds as its central claim that mental states are physical states of the brain, and that 
each type of these mental states or processes is in fact numerically identical with 
some type of physical state or process within the brain or central nervous system. 
This claim can as yet not be proven scientifically, as we do not know enough of the 
intricate functioning of the brain to actually state the relevant identities. But this is a 
natural view for materialist to hold, and has been argued for by philosophers like 
J.J.C. Smart 
 
Functionalism 
Functionalism is probably the main view in contemporary materialism. In contrast to 
reductive materialism, it claims that what is important for mentality is not the matter 
of which the creature in question is made of, but rather the structure of the internal 
activities which that matter sustains. A functionalist would claim that a being 
different from us in physical construction, such as an alien or an unknown animal, 
perhaps even a robot, may have internal mental states that are functionally isomorphic 
with our own internal states, even though the physical matter in which the mental 
states are sustained may differ from our own. 
Eliminative Materialism 
Eliminative materialism claims that the reason for our difficulty in coming to a real 
insight into the workings of consciousness is a problem of language. They claim that 
the problem lies in our common-sense psychological language framework (such as 
our talk of beliefs, desires, hopes and so on; what is sometimes called folk-
psychology), claiming that it is a false and misleading conception of the causes of our 
human behavior and of the nature of cognitive activity. According to eliminative 
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materialists, the solution is to eliminate this old framework and replace it with a 
vocabulary more adequate for neuroscientific understanding of our inner lives.  
 
Analysis 
 
After this review of the various concepts central to the projects debate of Chalmers, 
we now move into the work of Chalmers himself, and a critique thereof.  
The Chalmers Theory  
Chalmers´ view of consciousness takes as its point of departure the observation that 
consciousness covers many phenomena. (See page 6 of this paper)  
But for Chalmers, most of these aspects of consciousness are explainable given 
enough time and effort. According to Chalmers, science will resolve these problems 
eventually; therefore he calls these, the easy problems. However, according to 
Chalmers, one aspect of consciousness is not at all easy to explain:  the existence of 
Qualia. Current science cannot, says Chalmers, ever show why a person internally 
experiences reality. Why does experience comes with a raw feel? Why is there a 
subjective inner experience?  
 
The Experience view/Qualia 
Chalmers discredits the many different strategies at handling the consciousness 
problem from the materialist view. Strategies like: 
- Explain something else. 
- Take a harder line and deny the phenomenon 
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- Claim to be explaining experience in the full sense (And after some details about 
information processing are given, experience suddenly enters the picture, but it is left 
obscure how these processes should suddenly give rise to experience.) 
 
- Explain the structure of experience (This is useful for many purposes, but it tells us nothing 
about why there should be experience in the first place) 
 
- Isolate the substrate of experience. (Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly incomplete. For a 
satisfactory theory, we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we 
need an account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory 
bridge.) 
 
(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 15-16) 
 
Chalmers discredits most of these strategies via thought experiments, in the example 
of “deny the phenomenon”, one of the best known of these, is the zombie argument. 
It goes as follows: Given what we have learned, or will soon learn, from science 
about cognition, it seems reasonable to say, that one can imagine a robot or a creature 
very like us, who operates in a sophisticated way, just as we do, but lacks all 
subjective experience. Chalmers says that such zombies are real possibilities. If we 
“subtract” out the inner experience, we are left with rational creatures, whose 
behavior that science can explain. They look and act exactly like us, but what then is 
the role of Qualia? But we have Qualia! It´s one of the things we are most certain off. 
But can current science explain where they come from? Chalmers (who is interesting, 
precisely because he is a dualist with a very scientific outlook) argues that it cannot. 
Instead of a reductionist approach, Chalmers displays his own theory, as a solution to 
the problem.  
Chalmers´ first point is that Consciousness has been handled in the wrong way; 
instead of attempting to find the source of Conscious experience, in our current 
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materialistic view of the universe, we must rather accept it as being a fundamental 
fact about the world, much as electromagnetism, mass or space-time.(Facing Up to 
the Problem of Consciousness p. 19-20) 
 
 That is, Chalmers argues, Consciousness cannot be reduced to some other thing, and 
must be accepted as something fundamental and new.  
It is important to realize that (unlike many traditional dualists) Chalmers is not 
arguing that there is something so mysterious about subjective experience, that it lies 
beyond the reach of science. Rather, what he is saying is that subjective experience is 
so radically different from other phenomena, that science itself must be expanded in 
order to deal with it. Chalmers ultimately believes in science, and the constructive 
part of his work is an attempt to suggest the directions that science should explore to 
deal with Qualia. 
So the challenge for Chalmers is this: if Conscious experience is not connected to the 
physical, but works on a parallel level, then how do we learn anything about it? Since 
current modern science is not able to interact with this mental level of reality, he 
needs to explain what needs to be done to explore this new territory. Chalmers´ 
positive bid for a theory of consciousness is based on giving a number of speculative 
principles for the theory to rest upon; he gives us two non-basic and one basic 
principles. 
The two non-basic theories   
1. The principle of structural coherence  
This non-basic principle speaks of an existing coherence between the structure of 
consciousness and the structure of awareness. 
Chalmers claims that awareness is intimately linked to consciousness, and wherever 
we find consciousness, we also find awareness. If Chalmers is correct, then wherever 
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there is information that our senses and brain can obtain, there is also a corresponding 
conscious experience.  The direct correspondence between consciousness and 
awareness is what Chalmers finds important. Chalmers takes this correspondence 
further; he points out, that the structure of our inner experience is just like the 
structure of our awareness. He discusses the correspondence in this example of color 
sensations: 
“Take color sensations as an example. For every distinction between color 
experiences, there is a corresponding distinction in processing. The different 
phenomenal colors that we experience form a complex three-dimensional space, 
varying in hue, saturation, and intensity. 
The properties of this space can be recovered from information-processing 
considerations: examination of the visual systems shows that waveforms of light are 
discriminated and analyzed along three different axes, and it is this three-dimensional 
information that is relevant to later processing. The three-dimensional structure of 
phenomenal color space therefore corresponds directly to the three dimensional 
structure of visual awareness. This is precisely what we would expect. After all, every 
color distinction corresponds to some reportable information, and therefore to a 
distinction that is represented in the structure of processing.”  
(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 23) 
 
According to this example and the principle in general, any information that is 
consciously experienced will also be cognitively represented; this rule even applies to 
internal images and emotions as these also have structural properties that correspond 
directly to a structural property of processing.  Thus because the structural properties 
of experiences are accessible and reportable those properties will be directly 
represented in the structure of awareness. In short what Chalmers claims is this: 
“It is this isomorphism between the structures of consciousness and awareness that 
constitutes the principle of structural coherence.”   
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(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 23) 
 
There are however, says Chalmers, limits to this principle, as not all properties of 
experience are structural properties. Properties of experience, such as the intrinsic 
nature of sensations of red, that cannot be fully captured in a structural description, 
may be exchanged with (say) the sensation of green for example, but the structures of 
the experience itself, may remain the same nonetheless. This shows how central the 
principle of structural coherence is to our conception of our mental lives. 
We will return to this principle later, as it will be one of the main points of the 
projects´ discussion. 
 
The principle of Organizational invariance 
This second non-basic principle of Chalmers´ theory claims initially that: 
 
“any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have 
qualitatively identical experiences”  
(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 25) 
 
If we make a duplicate of the neural organization of the brain in silicon, and for every 
neuron in the brain, make the same patterns of interaction but with silicon chips, 
would not the same experiences arise? According to Chalmers and the principle 
above it might be identical. However if we have a brain made of normal neurons and 
a brain made of silicon chips, and we exchange the part of the neuron based brain that 
register the color red, with the same functional part of the silicon chip brain, might 
not the experience of “red” be different? Now, if the brain had both the neuron 
version and the silicon color center available, and we could flip a switch in order to 
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change which we used to have our color experiences via, might we not sense the 
change in experience? This Chalmers call the “Dancing Qualia” example.  
This idea claims that our inner experience is isomorphic with our awareness of the 
world, at least when it comes to the structures of it, but that the intrinsic quality of 
experience (the Qualia) may differ from person to person, or experience to 
experience. 
 
The double aspect information theory  
Chalmers recognizes that the two non-basic principles involve high-level notions 
such as awareness and organization, and thus lies at the wrong level to constitute 
fundamental laws in a theory of consciousness. Chalmers therefore needs a basic 
principle that fits in with the non-basic principles and supports them. 
This he provides with his double aspect theory of information. Information is here 
understood as that, where there is information, there are information states embedded 
in an information space. This space is an abstract object, but we can see information 
as physically embodied when there is a space of distinct physical states. 
Chalmers draws the double aspect principle from his observation that there is a direct 
isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain 
phenomenal (or experiential) information spaces. 
This is again a use of the same observations made in the principle of structural 
coherence. 
The double aspect theory builds upon the idea that wherever there is information (at 
least some information) there are two aspects of information, a physical aspect and a 
phenomenal aspect. 
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This is where Chalmers tries to explain the emergence of experience from the 
physical. This is truly the heart of his form of dualism:  
“Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other 
aspect is found embodied in physical processing”  
(Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 27) 
 
The theory is interesting, but highly speculative and hard to work with. Therefore I 
have not chosen to discuss it further, even though it might be considered Chalmers 
“golden calf”. 
 
A Deflationary Perspective 
Daniel C. Dennett responds to Chalmers´ article in his paper “Facing Backwards on 
the Problem of Consciousness”. Dennett is highly critical of Chalmers´ account, and 
we will discuss his main arguments in what follows. 
According to Dennett, the ideas of Chalmers are not a useful contribution to the 
research in the field of consciousness. Indeed, according to Dennett they are a major 
misdirector of attention, illusion generators. He gives a number of examples to 
support his claim.  
The vitalism example 
Here Dennett takes Chalmers´ definition of the hard and easy problems of 
consciousness, and applies the same logic to a different area, that of life itself.  
Dennett points out that a vitalist might comment on the work of a molecular biologist 
as follows: even though this work might explain many phenomena of living creatures, 
such as reproduction, growth and self-repair, these explanations would never explain 
life itself; some mysterious part remains unsolved, the “hard problem of life”.  That 
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is, Dennett is drawing an analogy between Chalmers´ attitude toward the cognitive 
sciences, to that of a vitalist´s attitude toward molecular biology.  
Dennett then points out that the sum of all the “easy” problems of life really do add 
up to an answer to the question “what is life”, as Dennett puts it, what else is there to 
explain over and above all these phenomena. To put it in another way, according to 
Dennett, there is no hard problem of life. And Dennett is suggesting that there is no 
hard question of consciousness either.   
To spell it out in more detail, just as this imaginary vitalist has gotten under the 
impression that being alive is something over and above the various subsidiary 
component phenomena connected to life, Chalmers has gotten under the impression 
that consciousness is something over and above the various subsidiary component 
phenomena connected to it. According to Dennett, Chalmers is just plain wrong. 
 
The Crock example 
Drawing on an example from Francis Crick, Dennett points out another problem with 
Chalmers´ theory: 
“Francis Crick (1994) gives us an example of what happens when you adopt 
Chalmers ´distinction, when he says, at the close of his book on consciousness “I have 
said almost nothing about qualia - the redness of red - except to brush it to one side 
and hope for the best.”(p. 256) But consider what would be wrong with the following 
claim made by an imaginary neuroscientist(Crock ”substituting “ perception” for 
“qualia” in the quotation from Crick: “I have said almost nothing about perception – 
the actual analysis and comprehension of the visual input  – except to brush it to one 
side and hope for the best”. Today we can all recognize that whatever came before 
Crock´s declaration would be forlorn, because not so many years ago this was a 
mistake that brain scientists actually made: they succumbed all too often to the 
temptation to treat vision as if it were television – as if it were simply a matter of 
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getting “the picture” from the eyes to the screen somewhere in the middle where it 
could be handsomely reproduced so that the phenomena of appreciation and analysis 
would get underway. Today we realize that the understanding – begins right away, on 
the retina; if you postpone consideration of it, you misdescribe how vision works. 
Crick has made a mistake: he has created an artifactual “hard” problem of 
perception, not noticing that it evaporates when the piecemeal work on the easy 
problem is completed. It is similarly a mistake for Crick, following Chalmers, to think 
that he can make progress on the easy questions of consciousness without in the 
process answering the hard question?  I think so (Dennett, 1991).  I make the parallel 
claim about the purported “subjective qualities” or qualia of experience: if you don´t 
begin breaking them down into their (functional) components from the outset, and 
distributing them throughout your model, you create a monster- an imaginary dazzle 
in the eye of a Cartesian homunculus” (Dennett , 1995) “  
(Explaining Consciousness p. 33-34, Jonathan Shear) 
Dennett ends his critique by admitting that Chalmers has not fallen into any one of 
these traps, not entirely anyway.  But according to Dennett, Chalmers avoids these 
problems by claiming that the “hard problem” of Consciousness is almost unique, but 
does gives not other examples to explain the “almost”. So there is nothing to compare 
the hard problem with. 
Dennett points out that Chalmers instead of explaining why the hard problem truly 
exists in the form Chalmers claims instead poses a question as his answer: “why is the 
performance of these functions accompanied by experience?” 
Yet the imaginary vitalist could pose the same question concerning life: “why is the 
performance of these functions accompanied by life?” To this, Dennett quite 
correctly points out that Chalmers would answer that the vitalist has made a 
conceptual mistake. Dennett agrees with this but demands an explanation from 
Chalmers as to why he himself has not made an analogous conceptual mistake.  
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Chalmers answers that consciousness remains free of this problem, as it is not bound 
to a physical explanation:  
“with experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in 
question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions 
does not suffice for the explanation of experience.” 
 (Explaining consciousness, Jonathan Shear, p. 18) 
This of course is based on Chalmers´ view of consciousness as a fundamental 
phenomena of the world alongside mass, charge and space-time, as we have seen 
earlier in the project. (See page 15 of this paper) 
This Dennett rejects and calls a mistaken claim.  
 
Critique and Cutism 
As a final augment against Chalmers theory, Dennett compares Chalmers´ idea of 
Consciousness as a fundamental force with the mocking example of “Cutism”. 
Dennett, tongue- in-cheek, argues for making the property of being cute, another 
fundamental force of the universe. Dennett is lumping together Cutism, Chalmers 
approach to consciousness and Vitalism as flawed theories. Moreover according to 
Dennett, they are flawed in a similar way. If we attempted to view any of them as 
fundamental force, we are making a purely subjective claim without any evidence or 
independent grounds. Dennett closes his judgment on Chalmers´ theory with the 
following dismissive words: 
“Until Chalmers gives us an independent ground for contemplating the drastic move of 
adding “experience” to mass, charge, and space – time, his proposal is one that can be put 
on the back burner” 
 (Explaining Consciousness, Jonathan Shear, p. 35)  
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Discussion 
In this discussion I will first take a critical view of Chalmers´ theories, and thereafter 
make a defense of the same. To this end, I will even defend positions I have 
previously argued against.  
Critique of Chalmers  
As we have just reviewed Dennett´s critical paper on Chalmers, let us take this as the 
starting point for our critical discussion. 
Dennett´s first criticism of Chalmers, that of the example with the vitalist, is as I see 
it not the strong point in the critique, as it alone is not enough to defeat Chalmers. 
Dennett´s example with life substituted instead of consciousness is easily rebuffed by 
Chalmers with his theory of Consciousness as a fundamental force and therefore 
something that cannot be compared to life, as least as Chalmers sees it. 
The Crock examples fares only slightly better in pointing out that Chalmers does not 
truly explain why consciousness exists, but instead answers the question with another 
question. This is problematic. Chalmers asks: “why is the performance of these 
functions accompanied by experience?” as his defense. So instead of proving his 
point with augments and facts, Chalmers returns the responsibility of solving the 
question to his opposition. Chalmers puts himself in a situation of being “correct until 
proven wrong”, by virtue of the statement. Here Chalmers is rather unorthodox in his 
way of proving his points of consciousness, both when it comes to auguring for his 
point of view and in general science. But we won’t discuss this further, as Dennett´s 
final point is much stronger. 
With the Cutism example, Dennett hits home. Here I see a real problem. As Dennett 
puts it, the concept of Consciousness as a fundamental force of the universe is so 
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highly speculative and fantastic in its creative imagination that we have no reason to 
believe it. Even though Dennett makes a mocking example of Chalmers theory of 
Consciousness as a fundamental force, the point is nonetheless clear: we have no 
reason to follow Chalmers in speculative theories of elemental property dualism until 
Chalmers gives us an independent ground for this speculation. 
Beyond the points of Dennett in “Facing up to the problem of Consciousness”, I see 
further obvious points of Chalmers´ theories worthy of critical questioning. 
In his article, Chalmers lists five different strategies often used to explain 
consciousness (see page 14-15 of this paper), strategies that are either flawed or lack 
certain things. Chalmers himself uses these strategies, but claims they are not 
problematic for him, because parts of his theory removing the potential obstacles.  
However, as I will now argue, this is not so.  
In a nutshell, in the last two of these strategies, Chalmers only avoid falling into 
problems, due to answers that are based on his more speculative theories. In my view 
the theories are to speculative to keep out of difficulties. Let´s take a closer look. 
 Explain the structure of experience (This is useful for many purposes, but it tells us nothing 
about why there should be experience in the first place) 
Chalmers himself points out that even though explaining the structure of experience 
is useful for many purposes (and this Chalmers himself does with his two non basic 
principles), it tells us nothing about why there should be experience in the first place. 
This Chalmers answers again with his view of Consciousness as being a universal 
fundamental force; this, as I pointed out above, is too speculative to be a valid 
defense that Chalmers does not make exactly the same mistake.  
 Isolate the substrate of experience. (Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly incomplete. For a 
satisfactory theory, we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we 
need an account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory 
bridge.) 
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Chalmers himself claims this strategy is incomplete, and for a satisfactory theory, 
what we need is: “An account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an 
explanatory bridge” (Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness p. 16) 
Chalmers own explanatory bridge exists in the form of his double aspect theory and 
his theory of consciousness as a fundamental force; both are highly speculative, and 
therefore not substantial enough to exclude Chalmers from also falling under his own 
criticism of this strategy.  
 
Defense of Chalmers  
I will take up the defense of Chalmers where we left the critique.  For the same 
reasons that we might criticize Chalmers in connection with the two strategies 
mentioned above, we can defend him using the fact that he (unlike so many others) 
actually tries to give the required additions to his theories that would exclude him 
from the strategies failings. The strengths of his theories that allegedly protect him 
from the strategies failings are debatable, but his theory’s do exist, and while he 
might not have direct proof of the theories, they have not been disproved either. 
A second point of defense of Chalmers is the lack of an acceptable answer to the 
question of “why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?” 
As long as Chalmers critics cannot give a fully convincing answer to this question, 
they must acknowledge that the functions of the cognitive brain is accompanied by 
experience, thereby accepting the first principle of Chalmers theory. I believe we 
must all admit that Chalmers is right; we all know intimately that we have 
experience, so experience exist alongside the cognitive. 
But a stronger point in the defense of Chalmers is that he is not an extreme dualist, he 
actually tries to hold the debate on middle ground. Chalmers goes out of his way to 
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acknowledges the great importance and expertise of science in exploring very many 
aspects of cognition and consciousness, so even though Chalmers states that his “hard 
problem” cannot be solved with science as it is “currently”, he does believe that 
science can solve the problem if it only widens its horizons and perspectives when 
concerned with Consciousness. In addition to this, Chalmers´ position is partly in 
agreement with the materialist stand of functionalism that holds that it is our internal 
mental structure, and not the physical matter of which they are build that is important 
for cognition. This is similar to Chalmers´ theory of Structural coherence, which 
employs the concept of isomorphism concerning the structures of our consciousness 
in connection with out mental awareness. Chalmers second´ non-basic principle of 
Organizational invariance supports this connection to functionalism as well, as this 
principle claims that if the matter our Consciousness supervenes upon is constructed 
with the same organizational structure, the functional structures of consciousness 
would be the same in a silicon chip made brain, or an alien brain made of something 
else.  
The Thought Experiment 
But to conclude my defense of Chalmers, and the discussion as a whole, I will 
describe a thought experiment of my own. I will try to use Chalmers´ principle of 
Structural Coherence, together with some Epistemological reflections upon self-
consciousness to give a proof of Chalmers´ first non-basic theory (The Principle of 
Structural Coherence).If I succeed in doing, or even if I only succeed partially, this 
will further support the dualistic notion of consciousness, not as arising from the 
brain but as existing next to it. 
My though experiment springs from the notion that our inner self’s may in certain 
circumstance be “cheated” into experiencing something other than our outer 
awareness is actually sensing, such as a pain inflicted on our body. I will try to 
explain and illustrate in the following. 
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The example I have in mind have to do with our introspective vision, and how it 
might give us an experience that is different from what is actually happening to our 
senses. First the example: 
“Consider now the argument that the distinction between appearance and reality must collapse in 
the case of sensations, since our apprehension of them is not mediated by anything that might 
misrepresent them. This argument is good only if misrepresentation by an intermediary is the only 
way in which errors could occur. But it is not. Even if introspection is unmediated by second-order 
“sensations”, nothing guarantees that the introspective judgment, “I am in pain”, will be caused 
only be the occurrence of pains. Perhaps other things as well can cause that judgment, at least in 
unusual circumstances, in which case the judgment would be false. Consider the occurrence of 
something rather similar to pain – a sudden sensation of extreme cold, for example – in a situation 
where one strongly expects to feel pain. Suppose you are a captured spy, being interrogated at 
length with repeated help of a hot iron pressed briefly to your back. In, on the twentieth trial, an ice 
cube is covertly pressed against your back, your immediate reaction will differ little or none from 
your first nineteen reactions. You almost certainly would think, for a brief moment, that you were 
feeling pain.” (Matter and Consciousness p. 76-77) 
This suggests that our inner experience can be cheated. An experience maybe of a 
sort the does not correspond with what we might call objective reality: sensory 
devices such as the nerves of our skin pick up cold instead of pain, but our mind 
might trick itself and thereby experience pain. 
Assuming this is the case, the example points to the following theory: the structure of 
awareness and the structure of consciousness are standardly coherent and isomorphic 
with each other. But this alignment may in exceptional circumstances, like the one 
above, be slightly broken if only for a few split seconds, before the isomorphism is 
restored by the mind as it realizes the experience had, does not match with reality. 
This example underline, first of all, that conscious experience (the phenomenal) 
follows Chalmers´ principle of structural coherence under most normal circumstance. 
And now for the key point:  If it for even a split second it is able to displace itself 
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from the isomorphic form its follows in connection with awareness, we may claim 
that we thereby have proof that it is there! To put it another way:  The breaking 
strongly suggests that two distinct structures are momentarily out of step, which of 
course means that there are two distinct structures just as dualism states. The mind 
cannot be cheated into breaking from its natural isomorphic tracking of the material if 
it is not there. 
This though experiment is a useful way of thinking about Chalmers theory. To make 
sure that it is fully clear, let us run through this augment visually. 
The following pictures try to show that there is an isomorphism between awareness 
and consciousness (just as Chalmers insists), and how we cannot normally see the 
inner level of consciousness, as it is perfectly isomorphic with the structures of 
awareness (again as per Chalmers theory). That is the two levels match so perfectly, 
we usually perceive them as a unity. But in the though experiment just described and 
in the diagrams just below, we break the isomorphism slightly. This both proves the 
rule of structural coherence, its not entirely infallible, but a principle none the less, 
and gives evidence toward proving the presence of the inner experience level.  
Symbol Rep. of the Structure of awareness (Green)  -  Symbol Rep. of the structure 
of consciousness( Red) 
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Symbol Rep. of the structural coherence principle in effect on both awareness and 
consciousness (therefore we can only “see” the awareness aspect)(Green is visible) 
 
Symbol Rep. of the structural coherence principle in effect on both awareness and 
consciousness ( but here we are, for the examples sake, able to “see” the underlying 
level of consciousness) ( Green with red underneath) 
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Symbol Rep. of the structure of consciousness (First Red symbol)  vs. Symbol Rep. 
of the structure of consciousness, but changed due to an experience not perceived in 
the same way as the bodily awareness senses the input. (Second Red symbol) 
 
Symbol Rep. of the both the structure of awareness and conscious experience, but 
briefly not isomorphic, due to the experience level being cheated by the example 
above, and therefore out of sync with the principle and the awareness structure it 
normally follows. (Green with Red 2 underneath) 
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Conclusion 
As we have seen Chalmers´ explain consciousness using duel aspect theory of 
information and the two connecting non-basic theories. He views consciousness as a 
fundamental force of the universe on pair with electromagnetism, mass, charge and 
space-time. 
This places Chalmers on the spectrum of Dualism vs. Materialism, in the dualist 
camp. To be more precise his form of dualism is a form of elemental property 
dualism, nonetheless, parts of his theories in common with the materialist 
functionalist view when it comes to the structures of consciousness. (See the 
descriptions of elemental property dualism and functionalism in the conceptual 
clarification of this paper, pages. 10 and 13) 
In my view, Chalmers does not create a whole new brand of dualism. Rather it is the 
way he views his dualism, and attempts to use it, that is interesting. In particular, he 
attempts to bridge the gap between the scientific mindset of the materialist approach 
and the “folk psychology” of the dualist view. So Chalmers is performing a balancing 
act. Chalmers has faith in science as the way to solve the challenges of 
consciousness, but believes that this will only become truly possible if science widens 
its gaze.  
Chalmers also differs from many other participants of the discussion on 
consciousness, due to the fact that he actually attempts to make a fundamental theory 
that we might use as a stepping stone to start exploring consciousness, contemporary 
dualist never seem to do this. We might say that Chalmers has a lot in common with 
Descartes, Descartes goal was to reconcile religion with the newly emerging sciences, 
his world view was designed to make world reconciliation possible, and he explicitly 
discussed how mind might be able to influence matter, even though nowadays we 
don’t find his ideas here (involving the penal gland) very convincing. There does not 
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seem to be a religious dimension in Chalmers writings, but he is clearly trying to 
build a bridge between materialists and the subjective view of the world, he believes 
both perspectives needs to be taken seriously, and that science offers a road to 
reconciliation. 
To sum up the result of my critique and defense of Chalmers I conclude the 
following: 
Dennett´s critique of Chalmers´ is well argued and points to certain week points in 
the more speculative of the theories, Chalmers´ views can nonetheless be defended as 
I have done above.  
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Dansk Resumé: 
Projektet omhandler den videnskabligt orienteret filosofiske detbat om bevidsthed. 
Projektets problemformulering og centrum for debat er David J. Chalmers teorier 
søgen på at besvare hvad han kalder ”det svære spørgsmål” om bevidsthed. Chalmers 
tilhører den dualistiske lejr af debatten, men er meget imødekommende over for et 
videnskabeligt svar på ”det svære spørgsmål”. Chalmers selv at give et bud på en 
løsning på spørgsmålet, ved at komme med hans egen teori. Denne teori er meget 
spekulativ og critisabel, derfor har projektet også en kritisk vinkel på Chalmers og 
hans teori. Chalmers søger bla. at løse problemet med bevidsthed ved at anskue 
bevidsthed som en fundamental kraft i universet på lige med elektromagnetisme, 
masse og rum-tid. Chalmers og hans teorier diskuteres i form af en kritik og et 
forsvar til sidst i projektet. 
